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ABSTRACT
Proprietary data for production workeit is analyzedto determine
which aspects of productivity are aftected bysecondary schooling.The
measures of productivity explored are:propensity to quit and beabsent,
plrsicaloatput per hour, and abilityto perform complex tasks.The data
suggeststhat the sorting effect of education isan important determinant of




NewYork, NY10021TESTING THE SORTING MODEL OF EDUCATION'
AndrewWeiss
Columbia University
New York, N.Y. 10027
and
Bell Communications Research
Revised July 16, 1984
U is well known that better educated workers earn more.Itis not well known why.
Are they paid more because of cognitive skills that are learned in school?Because of
affective skills that are learned? Or because of traits that are positively correlated with
length of schooling but are not learned during the years in which schooling differences
occur?This paper provides some tentative answers to those questions. We investigate
various aspects of the performance of production workers to seeif those aspects of
performance that are positively correlated with education are ones that were likely to have
been learned during the additional years of schooling acquired by the better educated
workers in our sample and which years were most important for the traits orskills
measured by the relevant performance criterion.In particular, we investigate whether
I.I am grateful to Roger Klein, Richard Spady. and participants at the Labor Economics seminars at the
University of Chicago and Columbia University. for valuable comments and suggestions. Gerald Mcligue.
All Mouzami and Andrea Shepard provided valuable assistance in processing the data andn computer
programming. John Raisian reconstructed his blue collar-white collar classiñcation scheme for us.-2-
better educated workers have a comparative advantage on more complex tasks: whether the
output per hour of better educated workersishigher than that of less well educated
workers: and whether better educated workers have a lower propensity to be absent or to
quit.We also investigate whether therelationship between each of these aspects oF
perFormance is continuous or whether there is a discrete change associated with high school
graduation. Our a prioripresumptionis that traits such as a low propensity to be absent
or to quit are likelto have been learned prior to attendance in secondary school (the
overwhelming majority of workersinour sample had between10 and14 years of
education).ThereFore. if the most significant aspect of performance difterences for our
sample is attendance or quit propensity we would argue that the evidence supports a sorting
explanation for the correlation between earnings and education.Of course, one could
argue that "persistence. the trait which affects absenteeism and quit propensity is learned
in secondary school. To allow for this possibility we let high school graduation to have a
dkcontinuous effect on an individual's probability of quitting his job or being absent. A
dkcontinuous effect ol high school graduation is not necessary br confirmation ob a sorting
model butitis consistent with a particular sorting equilibrium:, a mix of pooling and
separating contracts (see Weiss 11983. pp. 4331).Onthe other hand, the existence of
pooling Nash equilibria at 12 years of schooling, and the concomitant discontinuous jump
in perbormance at that schooling level, is inconsistent with the usual continuity assumptions
made in human capital theoretic models. We also used the PSID sample to investigate
whether the return to high school graduation is greater during business booms or slumps.
Presumably a low propensity to quit is less valued when unemployment is high and firms
are laying off workers.
We find that for high school graduation has a strong negative effect on absenteeismand
quit propensity. We also find that high school graduation has a large effect on the wages.3-
of individuals even if education, education squared and education cubed are &so included
as right hand variables in an earnings equation. This effect of graduating high school on
hourly earnings is counter cyclical; so that in periods and areas where unemployment is
high employers pay a smaller premium to high school graduate. Indeed we estimate thata
12% county unemployment rate completely eliminates the discontinuityin the wage
schedule at completion of12thgrade.2 3
In our conversations with personnel officers, a low proportion of leavers within their first
six months and a low rate of absenteeism were invariably named as the two most important
factors used to evaluate the quality of a cohort of workers. A low quit rat:, and low
absenteeism, may have a particularly strong effect on the productivity of production
workers.In manufacturing, production typically proceeds in series; in the 20 odd plants
we've visited the output of one worker is an input for another, and there are seldom more
than three workers doing any one job.Thus, when a new worker is being trained or a
2.P. H. Mirves and E. E. Lawler calculated that the total cost of turnover of a bank teller was 85 times as
large as his daily earnings plus benefits.Hence, if graduation from HS. decreases a workcm probability
of quitting during their first year on the job by 10%. and assuming the average work year was 240 days,
H.S. graduation would increase earnings of newly hired bank tellers by 3.fl.
3.Mirves and Lawler also estimated that the total cost of absenteeism for a sample of 160 bank tellers was
more than twice the cost in salaries and benefits- Thus if, as we estimate, HS. graduation restdts in a 14%
decreaseinthe percentage of days absent, then we would expect the negative correlation between
absenteeism and education to lead to a 2% higher wage for H.S. graduates working as bank teIcrs.
Allen (1981) used the 1972-73 Quality of Employment Survey to calculate the effectof wages on
absenteeism.He found that the elasticity of the abscnce rate with respect to marginal wage rate varies
from --35 to -.48.Since these elasticities stem from partial derivatives we can not directls impute the
elasticity of wages with respect to absenteeism from the inversc of Allen's estimates. Howeva his results
suggest that if, as we estimate, high school graduates are abscnt 14% lcss than we would expc4 from their
other demographic characteristics, then these difference in absenteeism could explain the entire wage
premium received by high school graduates. On the other hand, for all the usual reasons Alki's estimates
are likely to be biased toward zero,leading to overcstimates of the effect of absenteeism on wagc&
Allen also finds a negative, albeit minor, effect of high school graduation on absenteeism.Hrwever. since
he included wages as an independent variable in his abscnteeism equation, the model being atimated is
substantiallydifferentfrom ours-inwhich we areinvestigatingtheeffectof education on wages.
Consequently if better educated people are paid more bccausc they are absent less, it might appear that
once the researcher controlled for wages there was no statstically significant correlation betwesn education
and absenteeism.-4-
substitute used for an absent worker, the low output ofthe inexperienced worker affects the
output of other workers who must wait for parts.Because of the layout of the plants used
in this study and the complementarity between workersand machines. it is seldom possible
to avoid disruptions in the production processby temporarily replacing a trained worker
who leaves or is absent with several lessexperienced workers.Frequent changes in the
product mix generally make it too costly to accumulateenough inventory to fully cushion
the firm from the effect of quits or absenteeism.
I. TIlE DATA
In order to estimate the relative importanceof sorting and learning effects of education,
we assembled a data baseof 2,920 newly hired semi-skilled production workersemployed
by the same firm at three widely separatedgeographic locations.Each of these workers
was initially paid the samenon-linear piece-rate. When a worker achieves 835of expected
output for one month, the worker isassigned to a pay group.All the members of a pay
group receive the same pay.This pay is proportional to the output of the group —the
average group size is126 members — and promotion opportunities areinsignificant. so
there islittle financial incentive for group members toachieve at high levels of output.
Consequently, we only used the output of workersduring their first month on the job in this
study.
Because almost all workers wereassigned to a pay group within their first threemonths
on the job, and the lowerbound on earnings of newly hired workers was65% of thc wage
in a pay group, with earnings rising lessthan proportionately to output up to a ceiling at
83% of the pay group wage, annualearnings differences among the newly hiredworkers at
each location were trivial.Therefore, in the data analysis describedbelow we did not
compute these minor pay differences amongworkers.-5-
Previous studies of quit behavior, absenteeism or productivity that used samples of
workers with very different pay typkally included wages as independent variables.Those
studies suffer from simultaneous equation bias.If employers value a low propensity to be
absent or to quit or a high level of productivity, then workers who have those qualities (or
are perceived by employers as more likely to have thosequalities) will receive higher wages
and more training.Hence the error term inthe quit, absenteeism, and productivity
equationsiscorrelated with the wage variable and hence with all other independent
variables that are correlated with wages. Although all the workers at each location in our
sample receivedthe same wage,theyobviously did not have the same alternative
opportunities, the effect of differences in alternative opportunkies is discussed below.
The data base we assembled is also unique in providing a large and detailed sample of
workers on very similar jobs with almost identical wage profiles on those jobs. Hence we
are able to separate the effects of jobs on quits and absenteeism fromthe effects of person-
specific variables.That is, for a sample of workers on a wide variety of dilterent jobs a
reported low quit propensity of better educated workers could be due to steep wage tenure
profiles on the jobs they take.In our data set this problem does not arise since all workers
face the same wage-tenure profiles and promotion opportunities (nill).
For each worker data were available on sex, age, marital status, education, employment
status when the worker applied for work, and the complexityof the assigned job.4 as well
asoutputperhour(measuredinphysicalunits and normalized by theindustrial
engineering forceto be equivalent across jobs), number of days absent,number of
4.The industrial engineering staff measured the amount of time required For The average newlyhired worker
io learn each job.This Formula heavily weights the number of times per week an experienced operator
would perform The talk. We used the logarithm of required training as our estimate of job complexity.-6-
occasions absent, whether or not the worker quit and the date. The workers did not know
that they were the subjects of an empirical study.All the data were routinely collected
either by the personnel office, industrial engineers, or foremen at thethree locations.
Although the total sample contained 2.920 individuals, complete data were not available
for all workers.In some cases workers may have been assigned to jobs for which there
were no measures of job complexity, inother cases the worker failed to answer all the
questions on theapplication form.Alsoat eachlocationdifferentinformation was
available on the personnel records.In the southwest location, race data was not available
and only the screws half of the Crawford Physical Dexterity Test wasadministered; in the
other twolocationsboththepins and screwssectionsof thedexteritytestwere
administered before a worker was hired.6 The scores on this test were used bythe firm in
deciding whether to hire the worker, but were not used in assigningworkers to jobs.Job
assignments were random.
An additional problem arose at the southwest location: theplant was divided into two
halves, with significantly different promotional opportunities.Unfortunately the data did
not revealto which half of the plant particularworkers were assigned, thatinitial
assignment may not have been random. At that plant,workers assigned to more complex
jobs had better promotional opportunities.Because of these unobserved differences in
promotion opportunities, the relatively small sample size atlocation C. and the missing
data on race, prior experience, employment statuswhen they applied for this job, and
scores on the pins section of thedexterity test, we did not use data from the southwest
5.Consecutive days absent are recordcd as a single occasion of absenteeism,
6The Crawford Physical Dexterity Test is a two-part test.In the first part an individual uses a tweezers to
place pins into sleeves in a pegboard.In the second part small screws are screwed int.sleeves in the
pegboard. Each part of the tcst takes three minutes and the numberof operations performed in that time
is tabulated,-7-
location in estimating the quit equations below.
TableIpresents some summary statistics which provide a context within which to
evaluate the data. NA denotes data that were not available.
Insert Table Iabout here
Because this data set contains direct measures of three aspects of productivity: output
per hour, absenteeism (both percentage of days absent and occasions absent), and quit
propensity, itis possible to separately measure the effects of education for each of those
aspects of productivity.In addition, because the data includes a measure of the complexity
of the job to which the worker was assigned, one can estimate whether better educated
workers have a comparative advantage on more complex jobs.
Previous economic studies of the effect of education on labor productivity have not
differentiated among the various components of productivity: either wages were used as
proxies for productivity, or supervisor evaluations were taken to represent productivity (see
Medoff and Abraham 11980]). Each of those approaches has been criticized: the former
for assuming that wages are proportional to marginal products;' the latter for treating
subjective supervisor evaluations as objective measures of productivity. Studies that rely on
productivity measures of experienced workers within a given job classification are also
subject to important sample selection biases.For example, suppose that education has a
positive effect on performance within a given job, and that, as Medoff and Abraham find,
7.Studies that treat wagcs as equal to marginal products ignore the incentive, sorting and risk sharing effects
of wages that woutd cause the ratio of wages to productivity to vary systematically with eitbcr experience
or cducation.See, for example Salop [19741. Salop and Salop [19761. Lazear [19811. Calvo [19791,
Stiglitz [19741. Caivo and Wellisz [19791. Weiss [19801. Gua&ch and Weiss [1980. 19821 Frccman [19771
and Harris and Hoimstrom [19821.-8-
education(and performance) have positiveeffects on a worker's probability of being
promoted. Then among workers within a job classificaüon,(i.e., workers whohavenot
been promoted) education could be negatively correlated with performance even though
education increases the performance of workers on the job.8 These effects can be seen in
Figure I. The downward sloping line is the criterion for promotion from job Ito job 2.If
the dktdbution of perceived productivities were the same at all education levels, and were
a symmetric increasing hazard rate distribution, such as the normal or uniform, then on
both jobs the better educated workers would be perceived as being less able.9 This problem
does not arise for our data since none of the workers were promoted during the sample
period.'0 (Note that this sample selection bias does not affect the substantive point made
by Medoff and Abraham that within a sample of workers on the same job wages rise with
experience despite productivities falling with experience. We are simply pointing out that
in jobs in which there are significant promotional opportunities itis difficult to infer the
direct effect of expedence or education on productivity.)
Insert Figure I about here
Before showing how the data provides information on the relative contributions of the
sorting and learning aspects of education to earnings, we first examine the effectof
8.Note that the same arguments could be made to explain why Medoff and Abraham find thai more
experienced workers get worse supervisor recommendations.In most firmsseniority, education and
performance are all important criteria for promotion.
9.An increasinghazard ratedistributionischaracterizedby > C,where F(x)isthe
dxI—Fix)
disiribution of productivity and f(x) is the density.
10, Another potential problem with using subjective evaluations is that supervisors might measureperformance
relative to expectations rather than relative to some absolute levelas called for by the questionnaire.
However. Medoff and Abraham present evidence that these subjective evaluations are not tmportant
sources of bias..9.
education on earnings for some of the workers in our sample. and discuss whether
conclusions drawn from this subsample are applicable to a broader population.
At the midwest location job applicants were asked their wage at their most recent job
and whether or not they were currently employed atthat job.Using that data, we
estimated the effect of an additional year of education on the earnings of those workers
who were employed when they applied for their current job.'
2Earnings on the previous
job were used since forall workers at each plant monetary value of the jobper hour
worked was approximately the same. Column 3 of Table 2, contains estimates of the effect
of various demographic variables on the logarithm of the previous hourly wage of workers
at that plant.Columns Iand 2 reproduce the coefficients estimated by Wesley Mellow
using thc 1979 current population survey.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 can be used in various ways depending on how ambitious we wish to be.First,
the estimates of
8 In wage
provide a measure of the effect of education on the earnings (in
8 educ
their previous job) for the subsample of workers for whom we have earnings data. We
used that estimate as a standard, and then calculated how much of that effect can be
explained by the partial correlation between education and various aspects of performance
for workers in that limited sample. This approach does not make any assumptions about
II. We excluded unemployed workers from the sample since the wage on their previous job, one which they
either couldn't keep or chose to leave, does not seem reprcscntative of their expected earnings.In each
case wages at the previous job were used since wages for experienced workers on their current job are a
function solely of seniority and the output of the relevant pay group.
12. Obviously this is a biased estimate of the effect of Sucaton on earnings for workers in the population —
the workers in our sample chose to leave the jobs for which we have recorded their earnings.In section 3
we analyze the direction of this bias.-la-
the sample being representative of any largerpopulation, avoidingissuesof sample
selection bias, but simply seeks to find those factors that contributed to earnings differences
on previous jobs for workers within this subsample. We assume that performance on
current jobs is correlated with previous employers' perceptions of expected performance,
e.g. characteristics that are correlated with a low quit propensity may have been rewarded
on the previous job even if realized tenure on that job was low. A cautious generalization
is to assume that workers for whom usable pay data was available are representative of
workers in the sample so that a year of education has approximately a 4c effect on the
hourly wage on other jobs for the workers in this sample.'
A second use of the data in Table 2 is to provide a partial check of the importance of
sample selection bias for our sample. f one wishes to generalize our results outside our
sample.As Heckman has shown, sample selection bias can have major consequences for
the analysis of mic!o-economic data (see Heckman [19791). Since our major concern is in
explaining the positive correlation between education and earnings. itis useful to check to
see if the return of education in our sample is biased.This is a potentially serious problem
because one would expect that better educated individuals who apply for these jobs are less
representative of their schooling cohort than are less well educated workers. However, the
estimated value of the return on education for workers for whom we had wage data is
roughly the same as returns estimated using the C.P.S. sample. Thus it does not seem that
our sample differs from the CPS sample in waysthat grossly distort the effect of education
on earnings.In addition, the sign of the effect of race,sex, education, tenure, and
experience on the logarithm of the wage is the same for our sample as for the randomly
t3. We had usable data on previous pay far 77 of the workers employed ai themidwest localion (those
workers comprised 43% of the entire sample).—II—
selected CPS sample.
The personnel practices at these plants also provide grounds for believing that our
sample is representative. Only 22% of applicants whose applications were reviecd were
rejected. Of those, 85% were rejected because of a low score on the Crawford Physical
Dexterity Test. The estimation procedures included the worker's score on the dexterity test
as an independent variable, thus eliminating that potential source of sample selection bias.
In addition, the average pay increase for workers for whom we had wage data was 103%.
and workers waited more than 36 hours in freezing temperatures to receive job application
forms. This evidence indicates that the firm was paying above market wages, reducing the
sample selection problems derived from more sable" applicants not applying to the firm,
where ability refers to unobserved worker characteristics that are correlated both with
observed characteristics and with productivity)4 These high wages and the concomitant
excess supply of job applicants were routine features at the manufacturing locations of this
unionized firm.At another location of this firm recall notices were recently mailed to
former employees: 90% of those who had found alternative work quit their jobs to return to
work for the firm.Consequently we have assumed that sample selection biases were small
and have not correctedfor thcm.Alternatively we could have used the Bloom and
KillingsworthB-Kproceduretocorrectforsampleselectionbias.(Becausethe
characteristics of excluded observations are unknown the standard Heckit correction can't
be used.) However, the B-K procedure is extremely sensitive to assumptions about the
distribution of the error term in the selection equation)5 Indeed, as they point out, the
14.Of course some residual sample selection bias occurs if unobserved attributes that tead workers to wait on
tine longer, such as the ability io withstand the cold, are correlated with both performance measures and
with observed attributes we are studying.At the midwest location we know the individual's ptace on tine.
That number was uncorretaied with any of our measures of performance. Consequently, we have assumed
thai this source of bias is small and have disregarded it
IS. See Olsen (1982) and Muthén and Jöreskog (1983).-12-
cquationbeing estimated is only identified if the assumed distribution of theerror term of
the selection equation is nonlinear.
2. MODELS
Typical]yan individual'schoice of a level of secondary education is a function of both
observable and unobservable traits. The traits that are observable for our sample. and that
affect the schooling decision, include age, race, sex and manual dexterity. We grouped
together under the rubric 'stick-to-itiveness" all the unobserved attributes that affectan
individual1s choice of a level of schooling.Stick-to-itiveness represents the combined effect
on schooling level of characteristics such as a low time discount rate, self-discipline, desire
for variety, and susceptibility to illness or to the urge to "take a day off.'Years of
schoo]ing. and high school graduation are used as proxies for the traits referredto as
stick-to-it iveness.
In addition to representing these unobserved characteristics, education also indicatesa
level of training. We would expect that one skill that is acquired in school is the abilityto
learn complex tasks. Of course, that skill may have been acquired prior to the years of
schooling across which our sample differs (almost the entire sample had at least nine years
of education) and influenced the individual's choice of a level of education,Since we
intend to show the importance of the sorting effects of education, we assumc that skills
such as ability to learn complex tasks that affect the productivity of workers and that may
plausiblyhave beenlearnedinsecondary school were learnedthere.Thatis,we
intentionally bias our analysis against a sorting explanation of the effect of education on
earnings.
The performance equations we estimate are: whether or not the worker quit during his
first six months on the job, absenteeism (both days absent and occasions of absenteeism),-13-
and output per hour during the first month on the job as a fraction of his expected output
giventhecomplexity of the job.(These normalizations are routinely performed by the
industrialengineeringstaff as part of their efforts to compute the piece-rate for different
jobs.) The critical independent variables for the analysis are years of education, H.S.
graduation. job complexity, and a measure of the ematche between education level and job
complexity.
Match E[education-mean(education)I times
[job complexity -mean(job complexity)I.
Job complexity was computed by taking the logarithm of the number of weeks the plant's
industrial engineering staff estimatesitshould take a ne employee to learn the job
(achieve the average productivity rating for the factory on that job). The main component
in the industrial engineers' calculation is the number of times per week an experienced
worker performs the task.
In general we would expect stick-to-itiveness(those unobservable traits which lead
individuals to choose higherlevelsof schooling)to haveits greatesteffecton quit
propensities and to have a lesser effect on other aspects of behavior such as absenteeism.
On the other hand, one direct effect of education is to improve alternative opportunities,
increasing the probability of a quit.
2.1 The QuitModel
LetS1 denote worker i's present value of his current job, Vdenotei's present value of
his best opportunity elsewhere, and M1denotei's mobility costs (both real and psychic) of
a job change (housework and leisure are counted as jobs). Assume worker iis risk neutral
and quits if and only if
(I)-14-
To further specify U).denotethe time discountrateof workers by r,workeri's age at
the start of the observation period by a. and the value of an individual's altertiative and
present job at timetbyr/.(z) and S10) respectively.Then, assuming mae workers
anticipate working until they are 65 years old, and normalizing t— 0for the time during
which the quit decision is made
65—a,+3F
(2) V• —Si=fe_ [P(r) —SO)]dt.
whereFisadummy variable indicating whether a worker isa female, andis an
estimatedparameter of the problem.If females anticipate working fewer years. we would
estimate 0<0. Next, let p10) represent the probability individual i changes jobs after the
observation period and before period z, and let the value of that job change be a weighted
average of the value of the previous job and some constant term B,,
Assume that the values of the alternative and the present job grow at an exponential
rate so that
(3a) P(r) =e"'(Il—peOU V(o) + p,(r)(yP(0) + (l—)B,(0)]
(3b) S(r)= c"[i—pzS(0)+p1Q)&yS(0)+ (l—)Be(0)]
where 0 <y < 1.Then, letting 6— (r—u)andletting a1— 1—(I—y)p1(').workerI
quitsif and only if
65—a,+F
(4) fa1e'U-ç(o)—51(0)]dr>






Denoting by g(a,6,f3F), and substituting (5)-(7) into (4).
fi if g(a.ô,$F) EX1$1— — X383 > 0
(8)
1¼o otherwise
Clearly, the net gain from changing jobs. the left hand side of (8). will be measured with
error. We assumethiserror term,denoted MQ' is distributednormallywithzero mean and




The worker characteristics that we measured and that aWect alternative opportunities
include education, race, sex, age, geographic location, dexterity, as measured by scores on
the physicaldexteritytest, and employment status when hired ( a worker who was on a
temporarylay-off from a desirablepreviOusjob mightbe likely to quit when recalled from
the layoff).'6 Each of the factors affecting alternative opportunities could alsoaFfect job
satisfaction A',, thus the sign of those variables is indeterminant.However, we would
expect workers that were employed at the time of applicationto havea significantlyhigher
16-One might argue that employers should be concerned with the total effect of education onthe probability
of a worker quitting taking into account the better alternative opportunitiesavailable to the better cducated
workers.However, we are concerned with explaining wage differences in the market, not at thefirm being
studied. whcre there are no wage differences due to educalion differences.In the market cquilibrium better
cducated workcrs have higher wages. There is no cvidence that the gainfor a job change is positively
correlated with cducation.Hence, alternative opportunities have the same attraction for all workers but
better cducated workers have lower quit propensities.Itis this difference in quit propensities, not of the
effect of alternative opportunities. which contributes io differences in theequilibrium wage at different
education levels.-16-
level of job satisfaction (one reason they left the previous job was the anticipation of
increased job satisfaction) and hence to be less likely to quit.There are also job related
characteristics such as job complexity that affect job satisfaction but not alternative
opportunities.
Finally we would expect stick-to-itiveness (as measured by years of education and high
school graduation), and whether the worker is married to independently impose additional
mobility costs.Those variables are not multiplied by g(a,ô,$F).Theyenter directly into
the quit equation as elements of X3)7
As can be seen in Table 3a our major hypothesis is confirmed.I-I.S. graduation has a
strong negative effect on the probability of aworker quitting. This effect is independent of
the direct effect of schooling. We can reject the hypothesis thatthe only reason better
educated individuals have lower quit propensities is that they learned not to quitin school.
Equation (9) was estimated by the method of maximum likelihood, using apooled
sample from the southern and midwestern locations.Individuals were omitted if they were
laid-off before being with the firm for six months and selection bias wasavoided by also
omitting workers in the same hiring cohort that would have beenlaid-off before six month
had they not already quit.(All layoffs were made strictly by seniority).Because the
likelihood functionisalmost flat with respect to changes in6offset by compensating
changes in the vector of variables multiplied by 6, thestandard errors of 6 and of the
coefficientsofvariablesmultipliedby g(a,6,$F)arehigh.Althoughstatistically
insignificant, they have values consistent with the model.Individuals such as white males
that have better alternative opportunities are more likely toquit these jobs; workers who
l7. See Mincer (i 978) for art analysis of the effect of marital status onworker mobility.-17-
were employed when theyappliedforthese jobsarelesslikelytoquit.Similar
confirmation was provided by the negative value of . Our estimates suggest that females
in our sample anticipate spending 7 fewer years in the labor force than do males.This
finding is consistent with unpublished research by Jacob Mincer. Using the PSID sample
Mincer finds that women spend roughly 25% less time in the labor force than men. Finally
the similarity in the "t" statistics obtained using the gradient, hessian and White methods
suggests that the model is not grossly misspecifled.
To obtain more precise estimates of 13and 3,. and to make use of Mincer's findings on






where h (a.&yF) =
C
—.05
That is. we impose the restrictions that r —= .05 and that the effective work-life of
women is 25 shorter than that of men.
Equation (9a) was estimated using aprobit estimation procedure.The estimated
coefficients, and the effect of a change in each independent variable on theprobability of a
worker quitting are presented in Table 3B.
Insert Tables 3A and 3B about here
If job complexity and match are included asindependent variables, when (9a)is
estimated the sample size falls to 1532 and the absolute value of allthe I" statistics also
falls.However, none of the results shown in Table 313 are significantlyaffected: high•18-
school graduation is estimated to correspond to a reduction in the probability of the worker
quitting of -.052 at a 10 quit probability and -.083 at a 20Sf quit probability. Similarly if
quit propensity is estimated separately for men and women in our sample, the effects noted
in Table 3B hold for each subsample.
We checkedthefindingthathighschoolgraduationsignificantlyaffectsquit
propensities using the 1968-1982 PSID sample. We estimate that each year of post—
primary education has a statistically and economically insignificant effect on a worker's
quit rate, while completion of high school is associated with a reduction in the individual's
quit rate of roughly one-third.
Insert Table 4 about here
When tenure was not included in a standard earnings equation using the 1981 PSID
data set, the effect of high school graduation on the logarithm of wages is more than 3
times as large as the effect of completion of either 11th or 13th grade.If tenure effects are
included as a right hand variables, the impact of high school graduation on wages falls by
40c. Thus, to a considerable extent, the higher earnings of high school graduates are due
to rewards to their longer tenure, or their expected tenure.Even after correcting for
tenure, completion of 11th grade or 13th grade increases earnings byapproximately 4.7%.
while graduation from high schoolincreases earnings by approximately11%.(This
coefficientwasnotstatisticallysignificant:anotsurprisingresultgiventhe cubic
specification of the education function, as well as the permitted discontinuities at1-1.5.
graduation and college graduation, and the scarceness of observations outside of 10 to16
years of schooling. The cubic specification makesit unlikely that estimates of the effect of
high school graduation on earnings are capturing higher moments of therelationship-19-
between schooling and learning. Omitting the cubic term increases the "t statistics for all
the other education variables.
Insert Table 5 about here
2.2 Absenteeism Model
We first present a theoretical model that shows why differences in expected absenteeism
rates can significantly affect the wages of workers. We then estimate the discontinuities in
expected absenteeism rates associated with U.S. graduation for workers in our sample.In
evaluating the cost of absenteeism to firms. the nature of the production process is critical.
Traditional economic analyses of absenteeism assume a worker's marginal product is equal
to his wage and the cost of absenteeism is the wage of theworker.In this section we
consider the opposite polar case where the production process requires kworkers to
operate.If more than k workers are present. the extra workers are redundant, they do not
increase output,If fewer than k workers appear, output is zero. To simplify the notation,
we assume output is linear in the numberof workers, and normalize the value of output to
be equal to h. The number of workers hired is denoted by n.thewage of each worker by
w, the probability that a worker appearsfor work by p. and the expected profit of a firm
employing nworkersby lr(n).Welet P(S, ? k) denote the probability that at leastk
workers are present when nworkersare hired.Finally, we assume that workers are not
paid if they are absent (this assumption is made so that we can focus on theindirect costs
of absenteeism, rather than the direct cost of paying for aworker).
,r(n)iP(Sk)npw
Theexpected marginal product of the n+l worker is.20-
)k) —r(s,,k)J.
Thenet expected value orthemarginal worker is
ir(n+I) — r(n) = k)—(n+l)pco — kF(S,,> k) +npi.
—pkP(Sfl—l)+(1—p)1P(Sfl)—cP(Sfl)—pw,
=pc[nsk—I) —r(s ) k)] —pw.
(10) =k—I)
Theexpected value orthemarginal worker isthe probability that worker isdecisive
(enables the plant to operate) times the value of the productionprocess, minus that
workers expectedcostto the firm.
A firm increases the number of workers it employs so long as (10) is positive; it chooses
thesmallestnsuchthat
(ii) p'(i—p)'"1 —pu <0. wherej —k—I
(n—j)!j
Ifweconsider thecase where workers are paid even if they are absent, the usual policy






In Appendix A we present an example showing the effect of changes in(]-p). the
probability of a worker being absent, on the profitability of the firm.As that example
illustrates, even if firms do not pay workers when they are absent, a given change in the
probability or a worker being present can have a more than proportional effect on the
equilibrium wage of the worker.Consequently traitsthatare correlatedwith low-21-
absenteeismrates may be significantly rewarded in the labor market.
In estimating the determinants ofabsenteeismweassumethat a worker ismore likely
tobe absent the higher is his level of job dissatisfaction, and the lower his diligence. As in
the quit equation, job satisfaction is measuredbythe elementsofX1. We useeducation
andhigh school graduation as proxies for diligence—an individual who had insufficient
diligence orpersistenceto completehighschoolislikely to have poorer than expected
attendancehabits.We shall assume that absenteeism(both days and occasionsof
absenteeism as a percentage of possible days worked) is a linear function of X... ourproxies
fordiligence.anda normally distributederror term.
In the quit equation we were able to separate the effect of education onjob satisfaction
from its effect on stick-to-itiveness by arguing that jobsatisfaction has a greater effect on
thequitratesofworkerswithlongerexpectedfutureworklines.The
education x g(a.&c3,F)termcaptured the effect of education on quits that was caused by
its effect on either alternative opportunities or jobsatisfaction.This option is not available
to us in the absenteeism equations: we assumeworkers are trading off one periodgainsand
loses from absences. Consequently. the estimatedcoefficients on education and high school
graduation could be estimating the effect of lower (orhigher) levels of job satisfaction of
better educated workers on their absence rates. The resultsfrom the previously estimated
quit equations suggest this is not happening.
As mentioned, two measures of absenteeism are used asdependent variables.
Percentage of days absent is estimated using a Tobit procedure.Here, we are implicitly
assuming that discrete absenteeism data can be approximatedby a continuous distribution,
and that the error term in the estimation equation isnormally distributed but truncated so
that absenteeism rates that the modelpredicts would be negative are recorded as zeros.-22-
We calculated the percentage of days workers were absent during their first six monthson
the job; however, because not all the workers in our sample completed 6 months of work
those observations were weighted by the square root of the number of days for which they
were observed.
Insert Table 6 about here
We also used occasions of absent as a dependent variable.In those calculations we
restricted ourselves to individuals who worked for 6 months, and used the negative binomial
procedure described by Hausman, Griliches and Hall (HGH).
The implicit assumptions made by using the negative binomial model are that incidents
of absenteeism (several consecutive days absent are recorded as one incident) are generated
from a binomial distribution which, because of the large number of observations for each
individual, can be approximated by a Poisson arrival process; and that the X parameter
which describes the Poisson process has gamma distribution across the population. HGH
describe a maximum likelihood procedure to compute the effect of various independent
variables on X.(Because the probability of being absent is a function of whether the
worker was absent on the previous day, the independence assumption required by the
binomial distribution is inappropriate for modeling percentage of days absent.It seems
more reasonable to expect incidents of absenteeism to be independently distributed.)
Insert Table 7 about here
Whether days or occasions are used as a measure of absenteeism we find that high
school graduationhas anegativeeffecton absenteeism.This effectisstatistically-23-
significant regardless of the estimation procedure used. On the other hand education has a
positive, albeit statistically insignificant effect, on absenteeism. Thus, it seems unhkelv that
high school graduates learned in secondary school the traits that gave them low rates of
absenteeism.Instead,thesame unobservedcharacteristicsthatleadtosuccessful
completion of high school seem to lead to low rates of absenteeism.
2.3 Output Per Hour
The final indicator of performance explored was the logarithm of normalized output per
hour during the worker's first month at the plant.As previously noted, newly hired
workers are randomly assigned to jobs and paid piece-rate. We assume that output per
hour is a linear function of all our observed characteristics, including the match term
described above.
In Table 8 the OLS regression coefficients for this performance measure are reproduced
for each location with Hn statistics beneath them.
Insert Table 8 about here
From Table 8 we see that matching better educated people to more complex jobs has a
trivial effect on performance. This finding suggests that the pecuniary reward to education
for the workers in the sample is not due to skills learned in school that help those workers
learn complex production tasks.In Table 2 we computed the effect of education on the
logarithm of normalized previous pay for workers in Plant A. Our best estimate was that
each year of secondary education had a 4-5% effect on the pay of the workers in our
sample. On the other hand, restricting the sample to workers in that plant we find that
each year of education has only a 1fl effect on the output of workers in that plant.This-24-
effectwas not statistically significant.
Thustothe extent that the same characteristics that affect a workers output, ability to
perform complex jobs, absenteeism, and quitpropensityon their current job had a similar
effects on performance on previous jobs (where there are significant pay differences by
education), the data suggest that pay differences among the workers in our sample thatare
attributable to education are, in large part, due to factors such as a lower propensity to be
absent or to quit. and not exclusively due to differences in expected output per hour or the
ability of the better educated workers to learn more complex manufacturing jobs.Of
course, these pay differences may be due to the ability of better educated workers to
qualify for more complex non-manufacturing jobs, or for their performance to be higher in
non-manufacturing jobs. On the other hand, for many of the jobs in the service sector it
seemsunlikelythatskillslearnedinsecondary schoolaffectoutput.The implicit
assumption we are making is that the effect of education on productivity, and on the ability
to perform complex tasks, for the jobs encompassed by our data is similar to its effect on
the previous jobs of the workers in our sample.Figure 2 describes the distribution of jobs
in our sample according to the number of weeks required to learn each job.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Although one should be extremely cautious about generalizing these results beyond our
sample of semi-skilled production workers, the PSID data provides an indirect means of
gathering evidence of the impact of a low quit propensity on the wage premium received by
high school graduates.-25-
2.4 Magnitude of Effects
There is considerable evidence that during business slumps firms hoard workers: pay
wages above the value of the product of the workers.Implicit contract theory maintains
that these high levels of wages and employment are consequences of optimal risk sharing
between firms and workers. Consequently during severe business slumps we would expect
firms to benefit from (or be hurt less by) quits and unpaid absences.Consequently, to
obtain quantitative estimates of the effect of the low quit propensity and low absenteeism of
high school graduates on their wages, we interacted county unemployment rates with high
school graduation while estimating a wage equation for males workers in the PSID data set
between 1968 and 1981. As in Tables 4 and 5 we included education, education squared.
and education cubed as independent variables to reduce the possible role of high school
graduation in approximating a precluded degree of curvature in the relationship between a
dependent variable and education.
Insert Table 9 about here
We estimate that, if the county unemployment rate is zero, graduation from high school
has roughly 3 times as great an effect on wages as does completion of 11th grade. While,
if the county unemployment rate is over 12%, the wage premium received by high school
graduates disappears.
This pro.cyciical behavior of the wage premium for completion of high schoolis
especially surprising given the occupational distributions of high school dropouts and high
school graduates.High school dropouts are over represented among blue collar workers
(549 of the blue collar workers in the PSID sample were high school dropouts, while only
10% of the white collar workers were high school dropouts), Raisian finds that the wagesthose of white collar workers are procyclical. Hence the
high school graduates and high school dropouts would
school graduation to behave counter-cyclically.
We also found a general procyclical effect of unemployment on wages—however, that
relationship was sensitive to the particular specification chosen. When logarithms of the
unemployment rates are used as independent variables the coefficient of the logarithm of
the national unemployment rate is statistically insignificant, while the coefficient of the
logarithmofthe county unemployment rateminus the logarithm of thenational
unemployment rate is positive and statistically significant.This variable was introduced to
allow for the possibility, suggested by Hall, that areas of the county that have high
unemployment rates pay high wages.t9
3. SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS
As we discussed above, we have strong reasons for believing that sample selection bias
isnot a serious problem for our sample.However, to the extent sample selection is a
problem. the biases introduced prejudice the analysis against the results we obtained.
Hence our results are stronger than would be indicated from the estimated coefficients and
"I" statistics.
Since only a trivial number of applicants were rejected for reasons other than low
scores on the dexterity test, we shall restrict the discussion in this section to the biases
18. We used the same classification scheme as Raisian in determining which 2 digit occupations were blue
collar and which were white collar.
19. Note that the formulation we have chosen has the lorm lnKç, — xØ + ,,. where Tht —N(O.o'). Coleman has
argued against assuming that ,, is distributed lid, if one wishes to study cyclical effccts. He argues that a
more reasonable mode! is tnw, —x1, 5+r+t,. which allows br cyclical effects in the error term, and a GLS
estimation procedure.Consequently, the ", statistics br our OLS estimates of the cyclical variables
should be viewS with caution.
-26-
of blue collar workers relative to
different occupations chosen by
cause the wage premium for high-27-
introduced from the application decision ofworkers.
Imagine an unobserved application equation.A worker applies for a job with this firm
if and only if
(12) Xy >
Having applied and been accepted at thisjob, the worker subsequently quits if andonly if
(13) > E2l1XY > E'),
and is absent if and only if
(14) X,fl, > E31(X1 >
Because better educated workershad higher wages on their previous jobsand better
alternative opportunities. we would expectthe coefficient on education in(12)to be
negative.Since (12)is not observed.and education are negatively correlated.We
expect that, at least foremployed applicants.is positively correlated with E2 and . A
worker who was easily induced toleave his previous job is likely to be easilyinduced to
leave his current job.This low level of commitment to hisjob might also be expected to
lead to a higher than expectedprobability of being absent. Therefore, we expect E2and
to be negatively correlatedwith education in equations(13) and (14).Hence1 sample
selection causes an upward bias onthe estimated coefficients on educationand H.S.
graduation in the quit and absenteeismequations. leading to an underestimateof the
magnitude of the negative correlationbetween H.S. graduation and thepropensity to be
absent or to quit.Because most firms pay higher wages tobetter educated workers, they
are not subject tothis form of sample selection bias.In the market equilibrium it isthe
unbiased correlation betweeneducation and performance that determinesthe rate of return
to education. Thus wehave underestimated the effectof the negative correlation between
H.S. graduation and absenteeismand quit propensity on the correlationbetween earnings•28•
andH.S. graduation.
4.COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS STUDIES
4.1QuitRates
Previous estimates of the effect of education on quit propensity have varied widely.
However, with the exception of recent work by Flinn, Miller. and Mincer and Jovanovic,
those studies treated tenure as an independent variable without correcting for worker
heterogeneity and hence suffered from serious simultaneous equation biases)°
To see the source of that bias, imagine an unobserved tenure equation
(15) tenure—f(X) +,
aswell as an estimated quit equation.
Iif X$1 + (tenure) fl >'7:
(16) Quit—
0 otherwise
By including tenureinthe quit equation.(16)isholding tenure constant when
estimating the effect of the components of X on quit probabilities,if a particular element
of X (such as education) had a negative effect on quit propensity it would have a positive
effect on tenure. Holding tenure fixed forces education to be negatively correlated with ni
Sincenand'72arepositively correlated—individuals who for unobserved reasons have
more tenure than expected are likely to have lowerthan expected quit propensities—
educationisnegatively correlated with '72Consequently,the estimated coefficient for
20.The papers by Flinn and Miller do not direcily address ihe question ol the effect of education onquli
propensity: however in private conversaiions they confirmed thai their unreported results were consisteni
withtheresultsinthispaper.The Mincer and Jovanovic paperpartiallycorrectedforworker
heterogeneity by includingpreviousmobilityas an independent variableinthe quitequation they
estimated. They found that with this correction education was negatively correlated with quit ropensity.-29-
educationinEquation (16)isbiased upward.This bias could causethe estimated
correlationbetween education andquitpropensitytobepositive evenifthetrue
relationship is negative.
One might argue that itis the biased not the unbiased coefficient on education that
should concern us.That is, suppose a wage equation is estimated with tenureincluded as
an independent variable.If educationisaffecting wages throughitseffect on quit
propensity. the biased coefficient from the quit equation oneducation partially explains why
people with the same tenure levels, but differenteducation levels, receive different wages.
A wage equation that includes tenure as anindependent variable does not, however.
explain why earnings of better educated workers rise morerapidly with tenure than do the
earnings of less well educated workers. One possibleexplanation is that employers perceive
that better educated workers have lowerquit propensities than do less well educated
workers.Firms invest more resources in training bettereducated workers since the low
quit propensities of those workers enable firms to recapturetheir investments in human
capital.These differences in post-schooling trainingwould result in steeper wage-tenure
profiles for better educated workers. Consequently.schooling, by providing a signal of quit
propensity. would be rewarded in the short-term by greatertraining, and in the long-run by
higher life-time earnings.This argument does not preclude asocialreturn from the
signaling aspects of education—directing firmspecific training to workers with lowquit
propensities results in efficiency gains.
4.2 Credentialism
We have argued that the negative correlationbetween high school graduation andboth
quit propensity and absenteeism gives some asupport for a sorting explanationbr the
positive correlation between educationand earnings.There are several potential problems-30-
withusingthislineof reasoning.First,theliteraturereviewbyR. Lavard and
6. Psacharapoulos "The Screening Hypothesis and Returns to Education" seems to suggest
that the effect of education on earnings is not significantly greater for completion of high
school or college than for other years of education.However, thereisconsiderable
evidence that the rate of return to education is greatest in primary school (perhaps because
persistence as reflected in a low quit propensity and low absenteeism is taught there) and
lowestin post-secondary school(see George Psacharapoulos "Returns to Education: an
Updated Internationa) Comparison). Because a higher proportion of the education of high
school dropouts is in primary school, we would expect their rates of return to education to
be higher than the returns to high schod graduates even if completion of 12th grade has a
much greater effect on earnings than does completion of 11th or 10th grade.In our
sample, and in the PSID sampk we find that completion of high school has a strong effect
on earnings independent of the effect of education onearnings.21
Another possible reason for the wide range of estimates of the effect of high school
graduation on wages or earnings is that previous studies did not allow for the effect of the
unemployment rate on the premium for high school graduation. As we observed in Table 9
a high unemployment rate would wipe out the wage premum received by highschool
graduates. Hence, studks of the effect of high school graduation on earnings are sensitive
to the relevant unemployment rate for their sampks.
21. As discussed above, we estimate that for white males in the PSID sample completion of 11th or 13th grade
increases wages by roughly 4.7% while high school graduation increases wages by I4.9.Similarly we
estimated that completion of 15th grade increases wages by only 5.9% while compieting 16th grade
(graduation from college) increases wages by 144t Similarly Olsen. White and Shefrin found that, after
correcting for risk,the pecuniary beneñts of post-secondary education only outweigh the costs if the
individual graduates from college.In a private conversation Shefrin reported that they also found the same
result for secondary education and high school graduation.-31-
4.3 Absenteeism
A second potential criticism of ourproposed investigation is that absenteeism and quit
propensity are not important aspects of the productivityof workers.This claim was made
about absenteeism by Steven Allenin How Much Does AbsenteeismCostH.The
productivity equation Allen estimates is extremelysensitive to his model specification. He
treats labor, absenteeism and thecapital/labor ratio as independent variables in a Cobb—
Douglas production function estimating output perworker.However, firms with low
absenteeismrateschoosehighcapital-labor(KIL)ratios:thenegativeeffectof
absenteeism on output is greater the higher is theKILratio(alternatively firms whose
technology dictates high KILratioswill choose wage schedules and hiring criteria which
result in low absenteeism rates).Similarly. firms with high absenteeism rates employ more
workers to ensure adequate replacements in caseof excessive absenteeism. The KILratio,
labor and absenteeism should all be treated asendogenous variables.This is not a problem
for our analysis. We did not estimatethe effect of absenteeism on productivity.We
showed which worker characteristics werecorrelated with absenteeism and simulated, in
Appendk A. the possible impact of differencesin absenteeism on the market wage of
workers.
To see the importance of Allen's specification onhis results. suppose the only cost of
absenteeism is overmanning as reflected in alower capital-labor ratio.Then, output per
hour could either be specified as a functionIi ()ofboth the capital-labor ratio and the
absenteeism rate for the firm or as a functiong() of the capital—labor ratio.If g() is a
geometric function while h()is significantly different from theproduct of two geometric
functions, then Allen's econometricspecification would have all the costs ofabsenteeism
being captured by the capital-laborratio.-32-
Inan earlier paper Allen (1981) estimated determinant of absenteeism.In that paper
after correcting for wage differences he found that education does rot have a statistically
significani effect on absenteeism and the effect of wages on absenteeismis small, but
statistically significant.However if absenteeism directly effects wages—so thatto the
extent that better educated workers are less likely to be absent they are paid more—then
Allen may be measuring an extra-ordinarily large response of wages to absenteeism, as well
as a significant relationship between education and absenteeism.
4.4 Signaling
There have been several previous empirical studies of the possible signaling effects of
education on earnings.In particular John Riley [19791 and Kenneth Wolpin [19771 have
each used data on the relative incomes of self employed workers and employees of firms to
support a signaling explanation for the correlation between education and earnings. The
resultsinthis paper are consistent with their findings in support of signaling theory.
However, their results would also be generated by a pure human capital model with
unobserved heterogeneity across workers and random shocks affecting school leaving dates.
In that scenario the most able workers at any education level chse jobs where
productivity is directly rewarded. Consequently, as Riley and Wolpin find, earnings would
be higher in those occupations.(See Weiss [19801 for a non-signaling model in which
earnings are systematically higher for the self-employed.)
5.REVIEW OF RESULTS
Recentlarge sample studies have shown returns to education in the region of 5%. We
find a similar rate of return for the pay on their previous job for workers in our sample. A
large component of this rate of return is the discontinuous increase n wages associated
with high school graduation..33-
Presumably the higher earnings of high school graduates are due to their higher
productivitYrelativetohighschooldropouts.We investigatedfour components of
productivity: output per hour, comparative advantage on morecomplex task, propensity to
quit, and propensity to be absent. We found that highschool graduation appeared to be
uncorrelated with output per hour, and high school graduatesdid not appear to have a
comparative advantage on more complex jobs. On the otherhand, high school graduates
were significantly less likely to quit or tobe absent.
We also found that the significant wage premiumreceived by high school graduates in
the PSID sample is pro-cyclical. We estimated thatwhen the county unemployment rate
reaches 12% this wage premium vanishes.Consequently, if a low quit propensity and a low
rate of absenteeism, are valued moreduring booms than slumps this data provides further
support to the argument that a considerableportion of the estimated return to high school
graduation is due to the sorting effect of that credential.
Of course, one should be cautious in generalizingfrom this study to the economy as a
whole.In some occupations skills learned in secondaryschool clearly have a major effect
on productivityFor our sample it seems that those unobservedattributes that lead some
individuals to go to school longer than others. piay asignificant role in explaining the
higher earnings of better educated workers.REFERENCES
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MeanValue of the Relevant Variable
Plant APlant B Plant C
Midwest South Southwest
Plant Plant Plant
% White .72 .76 NA
% Black .24 .20 NA
Age 24.6 25.3 26.7
Education 12.1 12.2 11.9
¶ Employed at time of
application (I if employed,
0 otherwise) .64 .29 .38
E3 Male .57 .19 .41
% Married .43 .48 .42
Previous work
experience (in years) 3.54 NA NA
Weeks to learn job 7.5 5.1 11.7
Score on screws test 22.6 21.3 24.0
Score on pins test 22.4 23.5 NA
lstmonthoutput III 63 105
% days absent 2.96 2.3 31
%occasionsabsent 1.2 1.1 1.12
Quit rate in first
six months on job 9.8% 18.2% l2.3'cTABLE 2
REGRESSION ESTIMATES COMPARING THE IMPACT OFVARIOLS VARIABLES
ON LOG HOURLY EARNINGS IN 1979
Current Population Survey Samplc Vcrsus Wciss Samplc
("t — statistics in parentheses)
CPS CPS
With Size With Midwcst
of Firm Unionization Plant
Non-White -.070 -.073 -.027
(7.14) (5.24) (-1.52)
Female -.343 -262 -239
(5744) (21.86) (-1417)
Education .047 .045 .185
(573) (3.46) (2.48)
(Education/JO)2 084 .035 -570
(2.98) (.69) (-203)
Tenure 021 .012 .027
(10.60) (4.42) (.707)
(Tenurc/iO) -043 -029 -.120
(12.73) (6.26) (-1.70)
Age-Educ.-6 .022 M14 049
(1196) (4.88 (4.03)
((Age-Educ..61/i0) •.033 -042 -0.60
(15.84) (6.73) (-5.45)
Edjc. Times Tenure .038 .062 .0006
(2.98) (5.25) (.19)
Educ. Timcs (Age-Educ.-6) -069 -.039 -.002
(6.31) (3.89) (2.30)
Married Dummy yes yes yes
Number of Observations 18.551 18.551 1,251
.436 .524 .207
•CPS data .1w has dummy variables(orSMSA. rqio.z.xcupalio.l. indusIr)..nd tither nrm lilt ot union membership. whether or no' the
worker was employed part.time. and unionizationofindustry.
" Weiss data is from the o.zly plant iiithis,iudy tot which war dga cci 'he previous job is avijiable.The dependent variable is the
logarithmofihe wage thor most nt job divided by the meshwagein'he mony atthe t,me theyheld that job.or
In [
mosi recent previous pa) on their prtscni job the life time wages or allIhe workers of .11 Ihe workers are apptoxlmalely
average pay in L.S. at that date
ider.iical.(The smaller R2s in columns 3 and 4 comparedwith columnsIand 2 are due. in part.
to less variance in earningswithin the Weiss sample.)
Evaluating the effect ol additional year or education, tenureand experience al the
nican values in each samplebr education. tenure and experience:
a in (wage) .064 .041 .044
a educ.
81n (Igg) M16 .012 .031
ô tenure
a In (wage) .0056 oo4o .061
a experience (proxy)TABLE 3A
PROBABILITY OF QUIflING WITHIN FIRST SIX MONTHS ON THE JOB
MAXIMUMLIKELIHOODESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Estimated Standard Errors
Coefficient ("C' statistics below)
or Gradient Hessian White's
Independent Variable* Value Method Method Method
o 26 2.04 .61 .28
(-.13) (-.42) (-.91)
(effect of being female -6.81 42.3 10.6 4.19
on anticipated work-life) (-.16) (-.63) (-1.62)
H. S. Graduate -.342 .140 .135 .136
(-2.44) (-2.54) (-2.61)
College Graduate -.242 .367 .397 .444
(-.66) (-.62) (-.59)
Education -.07 .171 .057 .035
(-.44) (-.67) (-.76)
g(a.b.dF)x education .015 .143 .044 .029
(.11) (.34) (.53)
Married -.091 .078 .077 .077
(-1.16) (-1.18) (-1.17)
g(a.O..ãF)x employed -.098 .774 .231 .107
at application (-.13) (-.43) (-.92)
Number of observations 2146
Log Likelihood -741.99
Other independent variables included scores on each half of the dexterity test. race-location
interactions, location effects, age and an intercept term. We used three different methods
for calculating the standard errors because there is no consensus as to which is the correct
technique.If the model is correctly specified. the three methods give the same asymptotic
estimates. The estimates we obtain are sufficiently similar to provide some confidence that
the model is not grossly misspecified. Computational costs precluded performing themodel
specification test suggested by White.If the model is misspecified then only the White
standard errors have any economic content.TABLE 3B
PROBABILITY OF QUElliNG





Independent Variable Coefficient"s" statistic Quit Probability of
109 20
Intercept -.922 -L54
ItS. Graduate -.341 -2.54 -.059 -.096
College Graduate -.280 -.72 -.049 -.078
Education -.106 -1.32 -.019 -.030
Marrkd -.097 -1.26 -.017 -.027
h (a.i.;F) x education .0055 1.45 .00097 .0015
h(a.&,F)XagC -.00029 -.32 -.000052 -.000083
h(a.&;F) x male .0012 i6 .00022 .00034
x white x south .068 4.58 .012 .019
h(a.&;F) x south -.036 -2.34 -.0062 -.0099
x white x midwest .0061 1.00 .0011 .0017
h(a.&;F) x employed at application -.0023 -4.95 -.0040 -.0064
h(Q.&,F)x pins section .00020 .34 .000035 .000056
of dexterity test
x screws section .00094 1.94 .00016 .000:6
of dexterity test
Number of Observations 2146
set equal to -.25. 6 set equal to.05.
.124 of observations had Q — i; the meanof h(a.&F) is 16.12TABLE 4
QUITS PER YEAR FOR MALE PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYEES IN PSID SAMPLE196882#



















Mean Cty Unemp. minus -.003
Mean Nat. Unemp (-1.79)
Mean Quits per year .092
Number of Observations 3781
.16
#Each observation was weighted by the square rgot or the number of years theindivduaI was in the sample.
•The other independent variables were S locations and twourban-suburban dummy variables, marital status.
number of dependents, disabled, dummy variables for whether theindividual has fewer than 2 years and
fewer than 5 years of experience, as well as an intercept term.TABLE 5
DEPENDENTVARIABLE: LN VAGES FOR 1981PSID
SAMPLE OF WHITE MALES EMPLOYEES IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR














The ocher in dependeni variables wcrç SIccailons and iwo urban-suburban dumm' variables. mariial
sculus. union membership. experience, experience squared. and experience cubed.tellasan iniercepi
icr iii.TABLE 6























Employed at Application -1.23
(-3.56)
Number of Observations 1890
Lo Likelihood -4781.2
#The data for Tables 6 and 7 come from all locations of the firm, rather thaii the two included in thequit
equations.
*Each observation was weighted by the square root of the number of days worked- Dummyvariables for the
locations of the pLants. thç scores on the crews section of the denerity tt and race-locationinteractions
;t the two plants at which we had race data were alsojncluded as independent variable.TABLE 7
OCCASIONS ABSENT DURING THE
FIRST SIX MONTH ON THE JOB
Negative Binomial Mode'




















Employed at Application -.14
(-2.72)
Number of Observations 1565
Log Likelihood 1333.5
#Other independent variables were location, and score onthe screws section ol the dexterity test, and race-
location interactions br the two plants at which race data wasavailable.
Standard errors were calculated using the Hessian method.TABLE S
NORMALIZEDFIRST MONTH OUTPUT
Estimated Iy Ordinary Least Squares
























Number of Observations I 859
Multiple R-Square .380
Other independent variables were locationdummies.TABLE 9
LOGOFNOMINAL WAGES#
FOR MALE EMPLOYEES INTHE PRIVATESECIOR*
("tastatisticsin Parentheses)
Variable Parameter Estimates
HS * County Unemp. Rate -.0087 -.0087
(-3.61) (-3.61)






















Union Membership .191 .189
(30.58) (3018)




County Unemp. Rateminus .0014 .0011
National Unemp. rate (.68) (.5)National Uneinp. Rate -.0089 -.0Q96
(-2.59) (-2.76)




#AIthougthe fit declinedsignificantty moreof the estimated cocfiicients wrc changesif we iqposed a
coefficient of one on ¶he log CPI.
The model that is implicitly being estimatedis that the wage of individuat iin period:is 4 function of
time and person speciñc independentvarisbles and a normally dinributed error .,.If. as istikely. the
errprsare corretated over time theestimated t statinics are not consistent.Cross sçctional estimates
from single years ugge5t that this problem is notserious.Appendix A
Toillustrate the effect of absenteeism on the equilibrium valueof a worker to the firm
letus consider a production processwhich requires 20 workers to operate, generates
slO.000 of income per day if it operates, and has afixed cost of $5,000 per day whether it
operates or not. We shall assume workers are notpaid if they are absent.In equilibrium,
if the probability of a worker being absent isknown by all employers and firms complete
for workers so that wages are bid up to the levelwhere each production process earns zero
profits, we find that
Profit Maximizing
Probability of Number of Equilibrium













































WEEKS REQUIRED TO LEARN THE JOB
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FIGURE 2